Praxeology, Experimental Economics and the Process of Choice

F.A. Hayek and Vernon Smith on the Misesian Action Axiom

Originally published in Review of Austrian Economics

Mises’s action axiom postulates that human action is purposeful behavior. While this axiom is the building block for a powerful methodology, it is also incomplete, because it sets aside the underlying processes of decision-making. And while Mises does not dismiss the gap between intention and action, he is silent on it, relegating such a study to psychology. We contend that a study of underlying thought patterns and the process of choice – rather than contradicting praxeology and the action axiom – in fact complements the writings of Mises.

Mises’s action axiom postulates that human action is purposeful behavior. While this axiom is the building block for a powerful methodology, it is also incomplete, because it sets aside the underlying processes of decision-making. And while Mises does not dismiss the gap between intention and action, he is silent on it, relegating such a study to psychology. We contend that a study of underlying thought patterns and the process of choice – rather than contradicting praxeology and the action axiom – in fact complements the writings of Mises. To demonstrate this, we look at two authors: F.A. Hayek and Vernon Smith. Hayek’s theory of the sensory order sheds light on the process of choice, and explains how decision-making is contextually embedded. Smith’s concepts of ecological rationality and neurological “hard-wiring” help us understand decision-making. We argue that cognitive foundations enrich our understanding of the process of choice, and thus of the Misesian action axiom.